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Abstract
We address the problem of a ﬁnite horizon single item maintenance optimization structured
as a combination of preventive and corrective maintenance in a nuclear power plant environ-
ment. We present Bayesian semiparametric models to estimate the failure time distribution
and costs involved. The objective function for the optimization is the expected total cost of
maintenance over the pre-deﬁned ﬁnite time horizon. Typically, the mathematical model-
ing of failure times are based on parametric models. These models fail to capture the true
underlying relationships in the data; indeed, under a parametric assumption, the hazard
rates are treated as unimodal and skewed, which, as shown in this paper, is incorrect. Im-
portantly, assuming an increasing failure rate, as is typically done, we show, is way oﬀ the
mark in the present context. Since hazard and cost estimates feed into the optimization
phase, from a risk management perspective, potentially gross errors, resulting from purely
parametric models, can be obviated. We show the eﬀectiveness of our approach using real
data from the South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) located in Bay
City, Texas.
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1 Problem Statement
Proper maintenance scheduling is crucial for the safety and reliability of any nuclear power
generation plant. The Risk Management group of the plant is usually responsible for all
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) activities. The task is enormous - they have to keep
track of failure records for more than 40000 item-failure mode combinations. For many
of them the time between failures could be long (several years). Despite these challenges,
these items have to undergo regular preventive maintenance to assure the required electric
power generation level at maximum safety. The problem discussed in this paper involves
parameters and data provided by the South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company, a
nuclear power generation plant with two reactors, located in Bay City, Texas.
The maintenance policy that is being followed in practice is a combination of preventive
and corrective maintenance. The amount of literature on single item maintenance is enor-
mous; see Valdez-Florez and Feldman (1989) for an extensive review when the parameters
of the failure distribution are unknown but constant, and Wilson and Popova (1998) when
the parameters are random variables and Bayesian parametric analysis is performed. Most
of the published research assumes inﬁnite time horizon; see Chen and Popova (2000) for
Bayesian policies over a ﬁnite time horizon.
The problem analyzed in this paper has a ﬁnite horizon of length L. We consider the
following costs: Cpm – preventive maintenance cost, Ccm – corrective maintenance cost,
and Cd – downtime cost, which includes all lost production costs due to a disturbance in
the power generation. Let N(t) be the counting process for the number of failures in the
interval (0,t). Let the random time to failure of the item from its as-new state be governed
by distribution F. Further assume that each failure of the item causes a reduced power
production with probability p and in that case a downtime cost, Cd >C cm, will instead be
incurred. Note, if appropriate, this cost can include Ccm.
In this research we propose a Bayesian nonparametric model for the failure times dis-
tribution. The classical failure time modeling assumes a parametric distribution (like expo-
nential or Weibull) with parameter values that are, for instance, the maximum likelihood
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estimates. Standard Bayesian modeling assumes a parametric lifetime distribution and
makes inferences about its parameters via the posterior distribution derived using Bayes’
theorem; see Bernardo and Smith (1994). In the sequel, we will use the phrases “failure
rate” and “hazard rate” interchangeably.
This paper attempts to advance research in this context in two ways:
(A) Our proposed model takes the hazard rate to be a random “parameter”, and puts
the continuum of all distributions as it’s prior. This notion of placing a prior on function
spaces is termed “nonparametrics”. The choice of the word “nonparametrics” is unfortunate
because what we have is an inﬁnite-dimensional parameter. Ferguson (1973) was the ﬁrst
to consider this idea from a Bayesian perspective. Since then, there have been hundreds
of papers in a variety of contexts that use Bayesian nonparametric models; a compendium
of papers can be found in Dey and Rao (2006). Once a prior has been put on the space
of hazard rates, the posterior distribution of the hazard rate process is derived. Typically,
this posterior distribution will not have a closed form solution. Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods are used to obtain inferences from the posterior distributions of interest;
see, for example, Krishnan, Ramaswamy, Meyer and Damien (1999), and the references
therein. Real time failure data provided by STPNOC is used in the Bayesian modeling of
ﬁve diﬀerent systems. It will be seen that the true underlying hazard rate functions for
these power systems are multi-modal and diﬀer considerably from each other. This ﬁnding
is in sharp contrast to ﬁndings using parametric hazard rate models.
(B) We create a Bayesian mixture model to estimate the costs involved in our policy
deﬁnition as a function of covariates provided by STPNOC; see Fleming (2004), and (2002).
For these cost data, the analysis indicates that a simple parametric structure alone might
miss out on the true underlying relationships in the cost data.
Taken together, (A) and (B) will obviously impact the risk management optimization
model, to which we now turn. The maintenance policy being analyzed is:
Bring the item to the “as-good-as-new” state every T units of time (preventive maintenance)
at a cost of Cpm. If it fails meanwhile then repair it to the “as-good-as-old” state (corrective
maintenance) for a cost of Ccm or Cd, depending on whether the failure induces a disruption
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in power generation.
The goal is to ﬁnd the value of T that minimizes the total expected cost
z(T)=m i n
T∈A
{Cpm L/T  +[ pCd +( 1− p)Ccm] L/T E [N(T)]
+Cpm +[ pCd +( 1− p)Ccm] L/T E

N(L − T 
L
T
 )

, (1)
where A = {i − integer,i ∈ [0,L]},  ·  is the “ﬂoor” (round-down to nearest integer)
operator,  ·  is the “ceiling” (round-up to nearest integer) operator, and E [N(T)] is the
expected number of failures, taken with respect to the failure distribution, in the interval
(0,T). Barlow and Hunter (1960), showed that for the above deﬁned policy, the number
of CMs in an interval of length t follows a nonhomogeneous Poisson process with expected
number of failures in the interval (0,t),
E[N(t)] =
 t
0
q(u)du (2)
where q(u)=
f(u)
1−F(u) is the associated failure rate function. Galenko et. al. (2005) provide
an algorithm to ﬁnd the optimal T when the failure distribution is IFR (increasing failure
rate). In this research we obtain the optimal time to replacement via Monte Carlo sampling
since the IFR assumption does not hold for the set of data analyzed. We model q(u)
nonparametrically. In particular, we will obtain the optimal time of replacement given in
equation (1) via simulation because the IFR assumption is violated over time. Obviously,
this is likely to have repercussions for the risk management problem considered in this
paper.
We note a key point with respect to (1) at the outset. Since we approximate E[N(t)] via
Monte Carlo simulation, note that (1) is merely a functional of the probability distribution
of q(u), and the total cost estimates obtained via the Bayesian mixture model developed
in this paper. Hence, the actual maximization will be with respect to these stochastic
approximations.
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2 Bayesian semiparametric modeling of failure rate distribu-
tions
The required inputs for the optimization problem deﬁned in §1 are the failure time distribu-
tion, cost parameters, and the probability of power generation disruption. In this section we
present a Bayesian model for the ﬁrst of these inputs, namely, the failure rate distribution.
The failure data analyzed in this paper are for 5 diﬀerent systems, labeled as Group 1
through Group 5. Group 1 is EHC Servo valve that belongs to the electric-hydraulic control
system. Group 2 is EHC accumulator that belongs to the electric-hydraulic control system.
Group 3 is isolation valve that belongs to the same system. Group 4 is a ﬂow control valve
(16in) part of the full power feed water supply system, which supplies water to be heated
to steam to go to the electrical generation turbine. Group 5 is a ﬂow control valve (4in)
part of the low power feed water supply system which is used during plant startup for ﬁner
control of ﬂow. The data cover the time horizon from 1988 until 2003. For each group we
have the exact failure and (right) censored times. For Group 1 we have a total of 26 exact
observations, 20 for Group 2, 10 for Group 3, 17 for Group 4, and 10 for Group 5.
A very important practical consideration regarding the ﬁve groups was brought to our
attention by the engineers at STPNOC. Note that barring Group 2, all the others are valve
based systems. This, apparently, has consequences for the failure time distribution for
Group 2. The engineers, ap r i o r i , expect this failure time distribution to be quite distinct
from that of the other groups. From an optimization standpoint, this feature will likely
inﬂuence the ﬁnal decision.
2.1 Failure distribution
The assumption of constant failure rates with the associated exponential failure distribu-
tion and homogeneous Poisson process pervades analysis in today’s nuclear power industry.
Typically, the data gathered in industry are the number of failures in a given time period
(which is suﬃcient for exponential failure times). In general, we cannot expect to have
a “complete data set” but rather a collection of failure times and “success” times (a.k.a.
right censored times). The Risk Management Department at STPNOC has implemented
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the procedure now recommended by the U.S. Department of Energy; see Blanchard (1993):
the constant failure rate assumption is dropped in favor of a Bayesian scheme in which the
failure rate is assumed to be a gamma random variable (which is the conjugate prior for
the exponential distribution) and an updating procedure is deﬁned.
This methodology requires gathering, at a local level, only the number of failed items in
a given month. The mean of the posterior distribution, combining the local and industry-
wide history, of the failure rate is then used as a forecast of the frequency of failures for the
coming month. Wei et. al. (2004) and (2005) use a Bayesian estimation procedure when
the failure distribution is assumed Weibull.
It is well-known that the hazard function associated with a gamma random variable
is monotonically increasing or decreasing to unity as time tends to inﬁnity. However, a
Weibull family allows hazards to decay to zero or monotonically increase. Hence, it is a
common choice in reliability studies when one is uncertain ap r i o r ithat the instantaneous
risk of component failure becomes essentially constant after some time, as in the case of ex-
ponential and gamma random variables. The Weibull failure rate model is an improvement
on the constant failure rate model. But parametric models such as the exponential, gamma,
and Weibull models all imply that the hazard rate function is unimodal and skewed right.
This has serious consequences for the estimation of the expected value in equation (1) if the
true underlying failure rate is multi-modal with varying levels of skewness. An approach
that relaxes such stringent requirements on data while retaining the ﬂavor of these para-
metric families is therefore warranted. This is particularly relevant based on the engineers’
perspective about diﬀerences in the shapes of the hazard rates for each of the ﬁve groups,
articulated earlier.
The General Model
Consistent with most models in this context, the failure data is modeled using an accel-
erated failure time (AFT) speciﬁcation,
Sj(t)=S0(eβjt),j=2 ,3,4,5
where Sj(·) is the corresponding reliability function, and S0 is the “baseline” reliability
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function. A standard classical parametric approach might further assume S0 to be, say,
Weibull distributed. The parameters of the Weibull and the regression coeﬃcient β are
then estimated from the data. A Bayesian parametric Weibull model would require placing
prior distributions on the parameters of the Weibull distribution, as well as a prior on the
regression parameter β. Posterior distributions are then obtained.
To inject a Bayesian nonparametric model in the above framework, we modify and
use the mixture of Polya tree (MPT) models of Hanson (2004) in the present context.
These models are “centered” at some corresponding parametric models but allow signiﬁcant
data-driven deviations from parametric assumptions while retaining the predictive power
associated with parametric modeling. This point will be elaborated in some detail in the
next subsection. This more ﬂexible approach, in essence, assumes a nonparametric model
for S0; i.e., an MPT prior is placed on S0. For the power plant data considered in this paper,
without loss of generality, we take Group 1 to be represented by S0. Then, the covariates
are dummy variables corresponding to each of the remaining ﬁve groups in the data. Note
that, if needed, you can easily incorporate other continuous, time-dependent covariates as
well in the above formulation. We now turn to the details of the MPT model.
2.1.1 Polya Trees
Based on Lavine (1992), (1994), a Polya tree prior relies on a binary tree partitioning of
the sample space Ω. There are two aspects to a Polya tree: a binary tree partition of Ω
and a nonnegative parameter associated with each set in the binary partition. The binary
tree partition is given by Π = {B } where   is a binary sequence which “places” the set B 
in the tree. Denote the sets at level 1 by (B0,B 1), a measurable partition of Ω; denote by
(B00,B 01) the “oﬀspring” of B0,s ot h a tB00,B 01,B 10,B 11 denote the sets at level 2, and
so on. The number of partitions at the mth level is 2m. In general, B  splits into B 0 and
B 1 where B 0 ∩ B 1 = ∅ and B 0 ∪ B 1 = B .
A helpful image is that of a particle cascading through these partitions. It starts in Ω
and moves into B0 with probability C0,o ri n t oB1 with probability 1 − C0. In general,
on entering B  the particle could either move into B 0 or into B 1. Let it move into the
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former with probability C 0 and into the latter with probability C 1 =1− C 0.F o rP o l y a
trees, these probabilities are random, beta variables, (C 0,C  1) ∼ beta(α 0,α  1)w i t hn o n -
negative α 0 and α 1. If you denote the collection of αsb yA = {α }, a particular Polya
tree distribution is completely deﬁned by Π and A.
Insert Figure 1 here
Leaving the mathematical details to the Appendix, here we collect two pertinent facts
about Polya trees.
Fact 1 If the prior distribution is a Polya tree, then so is the posterior distribution with
both exact and right censored data. That is, the Polya tree is a conjugate prior, rendering
implementation rather easy as a consequence.
Fact 2 As a sound rule of thumb, Hanson and Johnson (2002) suggest setting M =
log2(n), where n is the sample size. In Figure 1, we would stop the binary partition at this
choice of M.
2.1.2 Mixtures of Polya Trees
Rather than place a Polya tree prior on the baseline hazard function, S0, in the Accelerated
Failure Time model, we prefer to place an MPT prior on S0.T h i si sb e c a u s eM P T sh a v e
superior properties. Here we note one of the most important ones that is useful in this
paper. (Some others are detailed in Appendix B.) This prior is attractive in that it is
easily centered at a parametric family such as the class of Weibull distributions. When
sample sizes are small, posterior inference has much more of a parametric ﬂavor due to the
centering family. When sample sizes increase, the data take over the prior and features such
as multi-modality and skew in the reliability distributions are better modeled; see, Berger
and Guglielmi (2001), Walker and Mallick (1999) and Hanson (2004).
A word on notation: The symbol “|” should be read as “given”.
What is an MPT model? We illustrate this via a simple linear regression model given
by
yi = b0 + b1x + vi,
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where vi is the error term, which is usually taken to be normally distributed with mean 0
and variance σ2,f o ri =1 ,···,n.
However, you could put a Polya tree prior on vi; that is, allow each error term to follow
a Polya tree distribution. The extension to an MPT prior then proceeds like so, where, in
the following, β is the vector of regression coeﬃcients, b0 and b1.
vi|G ∼ G,G|Θ ∼ PT(ΠΘ,A),Θ ∼ fΘ(θ),
and
β ∼ fβ(β).
The ﬁrst set of equations is an MPT model for the regression error term. Conditional
on a random draw from the hyperprior distribution fΘ(θ), we draw a random distribution
function, G, from a Polya tree, PT, and assign this distribution to the error term vi.Y o ud o
this for each i,o ro b s e r v a t i o n .fΘ(θ) is called the mixing distribution, and the data yi are
conditionally independent and identically distributed, with G as the distribution function.
fβ(β) is the prior distribution on the regression parameters. Since there is no analytical
solution to obtain the posterior distributions of these parameters, we employ a Markov
chain Monte Carlo scheme to sample all the unknowns in the model.
Now if you consider the AFT model instead of the linear regression above, and if you
place an MPT prior on the baseline hazard function, S0, we obtain a semiparametric re-
gression model for the data being analyzed in this paper. This model is described in the
Appendix.
2.1.3 Failure analysis
Among the ﬁve groups being considered, Group 1 was ﬁxed to be the baseline S0.S ot h e
model is then Sj(t)=S0(eβjt)f o rj =2 ,3,4,5. The acceleration factor eβj is the ratio of
mean time to failure of Group j to Group 1. Similarly, eβj1−βj2 is this ratio for Group j1
relative to j2. An MPT AFT model was ﬁt to these data following recommendations in
Hanson (2004); see the Appendix for details.
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Table 1: Coeﬃcients from MPT AFT analysis of failure time data.
Coef. Est. CI Coef. Est. CI
β2 3.83 (1.78, 5.11) β3 2.61 (0.92, 3.71)
β4 2.61 (1.00, 3.66) β5 2.58 (0.97, 3.62)
β2 − β3 1.13 (0.36, 1.97) β2 − β4 1.12 (0.43, 1.96)
β2 − β5 1.20 (0.47, 1.95) β3 − β4 −0.01 (−0.42, 0.50)
β3 − β5 0.01 (−0.36, 0.52) β4 − β5 0.02 (−0.15, 0.29)
From Table 1 we see that mean failure times from Group 1 are signiﬁcantly larger from
the other 4 groups. Group 2 has signiﬁcantly smaller mean failure times relative to the
other 4 groups, but groups 3, 4, and 5 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. For
example, the mean lifetimes of Group 2 are estimated to be e3.83 ≈ 46 times that of Group
1. Additionally, 95% simulation based conﬁdence intervals for these regression parameters
are provided in Table 1.
Insert Figure 2 here
Insert Figure 3 here
Now consider Figures 2 and 3, the estimated hazard rates, and their corresponding
survival probabilities. Note that the assumption of monotone hazards is unreasonable here.
Indeed, some of the estimated hazard functions have multiple modes. This would have
been lost if you modeled these data via a parametric family. From Figure 2, Groups 3, 4
and 5 exhibit a major overhaul between t = 5000 and t = 6000 (time scale in days), after
which the failure rate drops. Group 1 has a decreasing failure rate. Just as the engineers
expected, Group 2 is unique: its hazard rate provides evidence that several major overhauls
were done to this system throughout the observed time horizon. Likewise, in Figure 3 the
corresponding survival probabilities for the ﬁve groups are diﬀerent, with Group 2 showing
the highest probability of survival over the time horizon considered. These inferences from
the data would have remained hidden if you modeled these data via parametric models,
Bayesian or non-Bayesian.
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Table 2: Description of covariates used in the cost model.
psa A code to indicate the equipment’s level of risk (due to failure)
to core damage frequency
qr A code indicating the equipment is subject to additional
quality oversight
qaqc ”Quality Assurance/Quality Control”.
The equipment most likely has some function important to the safety of the plant
(ﬁre, safely shutdown, mitigate core damage, etc.)
eq A code to indicate if environmental qualiﬁcations (if any) is
required for the equipment
train A code that indicates which train of safety equipment is associated
with the equipment (if any)
pgi A code to indicate the equipment’s level of risk (due to failure)
to loss of electrical generation
frr A code to indicate the equipment’s level of combined risk (PGI and PSA)
to both core damage frequency and production loss
sc A code to designate if the equipment is designed to withstand hypothesized
earthquakes
arf A code to indicate if the equipment is used in ﬁre protection required
for safe shutdown of the plant
avf A code that indicates the type (if any)of THE American Society of Engineers
code that applies to the equipment
3 Cost estimation
There are three costs in our policy deﬁnition: cost for corrective maintenance, cost for
preventive maintenance, and loss production cost. STPNOC has records for the total cost
for any maintenance intervention (without distinguishing between corrective and preventive)
from 1987 until 2004. In addition there is descriptive information for each item in a separate
database as deﬁned in Table 2. There is no historical record for loss production cost.
In this section we present a model for the total maintenance cost as a function of the
set of categorical variables deﬁned in Table 2. We will assume that
Cpm
Ccm
= b
where b<1a n dCpm + Ccm = total cost. For each of the groups we have the estimated
number of plant down days using the STPNOC balance of plant model and we will use that
11Submitted to European Journal of Operational Research
information to assess the downtime cost Cd.
The cost data are highly skewed to the right, requiring a log transformation of total costs.
In addition to the main eﬀects of the regressors deﬁned in Table 2, we also considered the
following two-way interactions; qaqc × pgi, eq × frr, eq × avf, train × pgi, train × frr,
frr× arf,a n dfrr× avf.
Note that you could model the total costs regression, given below, using an MPT dis-
tribution for the error term. For the sake of illustration,in this paper we implemented a
simpler 2-component mixture of normal distributions for the error term. While it is not as
rich in structure as the MPT model, it is easier to implement on an on-going basis, which
is what the engineers intend to do. In the current context, this model can be thought of
as a happy medium between the Normal error regression model and MPT error regression
model. In the following 2-component mixture model we excluded interaction eﬀects for ease
in interpretation, noting that the ﬁnal optimization results did not vary much even with
interactions.
The model is given by:
log(total costi)=xi1β1 + ···+ xi,13β13 +  i,
where  1,...,  5409|G
iid ∼ G and G(t)=w1Φ(t|μ1,τ 1)+w2Φ(t|μ2,τ 2)w h e r eΦ ( ·|μ,τ)i s
the CDF of a N(0,1/τ) random variable. Following Bernardo and Smith (1994), non-
informative priors were placed on (w1,μ 1,μ 2,τ 1,τ 2). For total cost i, {xij}13
j=1 are the 13
indicator variables that deﬁne the ith group of main eﬀects qaqc,eq,train,pgi,frr,sc,arf,
and avf. The posterior medians and 95% equal-tailed credible intervals for model param-
eters are in Table 3. Neither qaqc or sc are signiﬁcant under the simple mixture-model on
the error terms. When dropping these two eﬀects, the remaining coeﬃcients change very
little except for eq = 1, which changes to −0.175 (−0.293, −0.062) and train = 1 changes
to 0.270 (0.151,0.388).
For the purposes of this paper, we work with total cost estimates from the 2-component
model, noting that similar results were obtained if you were to use an MPT model for the
error distribution, with or without interactions.
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Table 3: Coeﬃcients from regression analysis of log cost data.
Coef. Est. CI Coef. Est. CI
qaqc=1 −0.080 (−0.382, 0.232) eq=1 −0.248 (−0.374, −0.123)
train=1 0.188 (0.057, 0.322) arf=1 1.679 (1.308,2.043)
pgi=1 0.071 (−0.015,0.159) frr=1 0.239 (0.133,0.347)
pgi=2 1.064 (0.907,1.225) frr=2 0.594 (0.401,0.788)
pgi=3 1.559 (1.201,1.923) frr=3 1.026 (0.801,1.251)
sc=1 0.080 (−0.237,0.409) avf=1 −0.249 (−0.400,−0.105)
sc=2 −0.099 (−0.404,0.216) w1 0.980 (0.976,0.983)
μ1 7.628 (7.288,7.966) τ1 0.357 (0.343,0.371)
μ2 0.158 (−0.174,0.489) τ2 11.23 (7.83,16.13)
4 Optimal time of replacement
Here we describe the procedure to obtain the time T that minimizes the total cost (1).
Galenko, Morton, Popova, Kee, Grantom and Sun (2005) show that if the failure time
distribution is increasing failure rate then the objective function (1) is piece-wise convex,
with discontinuities at the points L/n,n =1 ,2,... and developed an algorithm that ﬁrst
ﬁnds the optimal time T using the continuous version of (1) and then produces the optimal
T for the original objective function (1).
Proposition 1. The objective function (1) is lower semicontinuous with discontinuities at
points L/n,n =1 ,2,....
Proof. See the Appendix
Given this property and the fact that we have a ﬁnite time horizon, the minimum is
attainable (see Rockafellar and Wets (1998), page 11, Theorem 1.9). Hence, we can ﬁnd the
optimal time for replacement T by evaluating the objective function over a grid of points
T =1 ,2,...,L,w h e r eL = 1000 weeks. This is approximately the time left on the nuclear
power plant’s license to operate. We choose 1 week to be the time increment.
First, we run the simulation procedure as described in §2.1 to obtain estimates of the pre-
dictive survival probabilities for each interval (0,i),i=1 ,2...,1000. The expected number
of failures in the interval (0,i), using the relationship (2), will then equal to −ln(S(i)).
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Table 4: Optimization results.
Group Min Cost T
1 $162,463 1000
2 $281,405 1000
3 $294,209 501
4 $236,987 501
5 $81,630 501
Then we input the expected number of failures, the cost estimates as computed in §3,
and the probability of a production loss using the STPNOC Balance of Plant Model in the
objective function (1) (see Kee et. al. (2002)) to get the resulting costs for each of the ﬁve
groups.
Table 4 shows the minimum cost for each group and the associated time for preventive
maintenance T. Groups 1 and 2, and groups 3 through 5 collate together in terms of the
preventive maintenance time, T, respectively.
For each of the ﬁve groups, we found the shape of each piece of the objective function
to be interesting. For illustration, consider Figure 4 for a “zoom-in” of the cost of Group
5. It is not monotonic or convex, which eliminates the possibility of ﬁnding its minimum
by designing an algorithm diﬀerent from grid evaluation.
Insert Figure 4 here
Recall from Figure 2 that the shape of the hazard functions of groups 3,4, and 5 implied
that a major overhaul was performed between weeks 600-650 on the corresponding systems.
A natural question arises as a result: “Did these overhauls bring the systems to an as-
good-as-new state?”. We will answer this question using the following set of simulation
experiments.
First, the original data were censored at week 400 and predictive survival probabilities
for the next 1000 weeks were computed. This was repeated by introducing censoring at
weeks 500, 600, 700, 800, and 900. Thus, at each of these time points, we have the future
failure behavior for each of the groups. As an illustration, consider Figure 5 which shows
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the predictive survival functions for Group 5. The survival functions that correspond to
censoring times 800 and 900 are quite diﬀerent from the functions censored at earlier times.
The answer to our question is clear - major overhaul did change the probabilistic behavior
of this group. This is in fact an example where the stochastic evolution of a system is
decision dependent - on the maintenance intervention performed.
Insert Figure 5 here
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we addressed the problem of a ﬁnite horizon single item maintenance opti-
mization structured as a combination of preventive and corrective maintenance in a nuclear
power plant environment. Two Bayesian models were developed to model the failure time
distributions, and the random error term in the regression of total costs, respectively. The
nonparametric component in the Bayesian model nicely captures features such as multi-
modality and varying degrees of skewness in the data. This is in sharp contrast to models
used in this context which typically assume that the hazard rates are increasing monotoni-
cally. Since the hazard rate and cost estimates feed into the optimization phase, from a risk
management perspective, potentially gross errors, resulting from purely parametric models,
can be obviated. The models and the optimization were exempliﬁed using real data from the
South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) located in Bay City, Texas.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Polya tree prior distributions
Lavine (1992): A random probability measure F on Ω is said to have a Polya tree distribu-
tion, or a Polya tree prior, with parameters (Π,A), written F ∼ PT(Π,A), if there exist
non-negative numbers A =( α0,α 1,α 00,...) and random variables C =( C0,C 00,C 10,...)
such that the following hold:
i) all the random variables in C are independent;
ii) for every  ,C 0 ∼ β(α 0,α  0); and
iii) for every m =1 ,2,...and every   =  1 ...  m deﬁne
F(B 1... m)=

m 
j=1
 j=0C 1... j−10

m 
j=1
 j=1(1 − C 1... j−10)

,
where the ﬁrst terms (i.e., for j = 1) are interpreted as C0 and 1 − C0.
Posterior distributions: Consider a Polya tree prior PT(Π,A). Then, given an observation
Y1, the posterior Polya tree distribution is easily obtained. Write (F|Y1) ∼ PT(Π,A|Y1)
with (A|Y1)g i v e nb y
α |Y1 =
	
α  +1 ifY1 ∈ B 
α  otherwise.
If Y1 is observed exactly, then an α needs to be updated at each level, whereas in the
case of censored data (in one of the sets B ), only a ﬁnite number require to be updated.
For n observations, let Y =( Y1,···,Y n), with (A|Y)g i v e nb y( α |Y)=α  + n ,w h e r e
n  is the number of observations in B .L e tq  = P(Yn+1 ∈ B |Y), for some  ,d e n o t et h e
posterior predictive distribution, and let   =  1 ··· m; then, in the absence of censoring,
q  =
α 1 + n 1
α0 + α1 + n
α 1 2 + n 1 2
α 10 + α 11 + n 1
...
α 1... m + n 1... m
α 1··· m−10 + α 1··· m−11 + n 1... m−1
.
For censored data,
q  =
α 1 + n 1
α0 + α1 + n
···
α 1... m + n 1... m
α 1··· m−10 + α 1··· m−11 + n 1... m−1 − s 1... m−1
,
where s  is the number of observations censored in B .
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7.2 Mixtures of Polya Trees
Extending the work of Lavine (1992), (1994), mixtures of Polya trees have been considered
by Berger and Guglielmi (2001), Walker and Mallick (1999) and Hanson and Johnson (2002).
Consider a mixture of Polya trees prior on S0,
S0|θ ∼ PT(c,ρ,Gθ), (3)
θ ∼ p(θ), (4)
where (3) is shorthand for a particular Polya tree prior, Hanson (2004). We brieﬂy describe
the prior but leave details to the references above.
Let J be a ﬁxed, positive integer and let Gθ denote the family of Weibull cumula-
tive distribution functions, Gθ(t)=1− exp{−(t/λ)α} for t ≥ 0, where θ =( α,λ) .T h e
distribution Gθ serves to center the distribution of the Polya tree prior. A Polya tree
prior is constructed from a set of partitions Πθ and a family A of positive real num-
bers. Consider the family of partitions Πθ = {Bθ( ):  ∈

J
l=1{0,1}l}.I f j is the
base-10 representation of the binary number   =  1 ··· k at level k,t h e nBθ( 1 ··· k)i s
deﬁned to be the interval (G−1
θ (j/2k),G −1
θ ((j +1 ) /2k)). For example, with k =3 ,a n d
  = 000, then j =0a n dBθ(000) = (0,G −1
θ (1/8)), and with   = 010, then j =2a n d
Bθ(010) = (G−1
θ (2/8),G −1
θ (3/8)), etc.
Note then that at each level k,t h ec l a s s{Bθ( ):  ∈{ 0,1}k} forms a partition of
the positive reals and furthermore Bθ( 1 ··· k)=Bθ( 1 ··· k0)


Bθ( 1 ··· k1) for k =
1,2,...,M−1. Note that M is the number of partitions of the Polya tree. As a sound rule
of thumb, Hanson and Johnson (2002) suggest setting M = log2(n), where n is the sample
size. We take the family A = {α  :   ∈

M
j=1{0,1}j} to be deﬁned by α 1··· k = wk2 for
some w>0; see, also, Walker and Mallick (1999), and Hanson and Johnson (2002). As w
tends to zero the posterior baseline is almost entirely data-driven. As w tends to inﬁnity
we obtain a fully parametric analysis.
Given Πθ and A, the Polya tree prior is deﬁned up to level J by the random vectors
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Y = {(Y 0,Y  1):  ∈

M−1
j=0 {0,1}j} through the product
S0{Bθ( 1 ··· k)|Y,θ} =
k 
j=1
Y 1··· j, (5)
for k =1 ,2,...,M, where we deﬁne S0(A) to be the baseline measure of any set A.T h e
vectors (Y 0,Y  1) are independent Dirichlet distributions:
(Y 0,Y  1) ∼ Dirichlet(α 0,α  1),  ∈
M−1 
j=0
{0,1}j. (6)
The Polya tree parameters “adjust” conditional probabilities, and hence the shape of
the survival density f0, relative to a parametric centering family of distributions. If the
data are truly distributed Gθ, then observations should, on average, be evenly distributed
among partition sets at any level j. Under the Polya tree posterior, if more observations fall
into interval Bθ( 0) ⊂ R+ than its companion set Bθ( 1), the conditional probability Y 0
of Bθ( 0) is accordingly stochastically “increased” relative to Y 1. This adaptability makes
the Polya tree attractive in its ﬂexibility, but also anchors the random S0 ﬁrmly about the
family {Sθ : θ ∈ Θ}.
Beyond sets at the level J in Πθ we assume S0|Y,θ follows the baseline Gθ.H a n s o n
and Johnson (2002) show that this assumption yields predictive distributions that are the
same as from a fully speciﬁed (inﬁnite) Polya tree for large enough J; this assumption also
avoids a complication involving inﬁnite probability in the tail of the density f0|Y,θ that
arises from taking f0|Y,θ to be ﬂat on these sets.
Deﬁne the vector of probabilities p = p(Y)=( p1,p 2,...,p 2J)  as
pj+1 = S0{Bθ( 1 ··· J)|Y,θ} =
J 
i=1
Y 1··· i
where  1 ··· J is the base-2 representation of j, j =0 ,...,2J − 1. After simpliﬁcation, the
baseline survival function is,
S0(t|Y,θ)=pN

N − 2JGθ(t)

+
2J 
j=N+1
pj, (7)
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where N denotes the integer part of 2JGθ(t)+1andwheregθ(·) is the density corresponding
to Gθ. The density associated with S0(t|Y,θ)i sg i v e nb y
f0(t|Y,θ)=
2J 
j=1
2Jpjgθ(t)IBθ( J(j−1))(t)=2 JpNgθ(t), (8)
where  J(i) is the binary representation  1 ··· J of the integer i and N as is in (7). Note
that the number of elements of Y may be moderate. This number is
J
j=1 2j =2 J+1 − 2.
For J = 5, a typical level, this is 62, of which half need to be sampled in a simulation
scheme.
The mixture of Polya trees (MPT) prior provides an intermediate choice between a
strictly parametric analysis and allowing S0 to be completely arbitrary. In some ways
it provides the best of both worlds. In areas where data are sparse, such as the tails,
the MPT prior places relatively more posterior mass on the underlying parametric family
{Gθ : θ ∈ Θ}. In areas where data are plentiful the posterior is more data driven; and
features not allowed in the strictly parametric model, such as left-skew and multimodality,
become apparent. The user-speciﬁed weight w controls how closely the posterior follows
{Gθ : θ ∈ Θ} with larger values of w yielding inference closer to that obtained from the
underlying parametric model. Hanson and Johnson (2002) describe priors for w;w es i m p l y
ﬁx w to be some small value, typically w =1 .
Assume standard, right censored reliability data D = {(xi,t i,δ i)}n
i=1,a n dl e tDi denote
the ith triple (xi,t i,δ i). Let Ti ∼ Sxi(·). As usual, δi = 0 indicates that ti is a censoring
time, Ti >t i,a n dδi = 1 denotes that ti is a survival time, Ti = ti.
Given S0 (through Y and θ)a n dβ, the survival function for covariates x is
Sx(t|Y,θ,β)=S0(ex βt|Y,θ), (9)
and the pdf is
fx(t|Y,θ,β)=ex βf0(ex βt|Y,θ), (10)
where S0(t|Y,θ)a n df0(t|Y,θ) are given by (7) and (8).
The likelihood for right censored data is given by
L(Y,θ,β)=
n 
i=1
fxi(ti|Y,θ,β)δiSxi(ti|Y,θ,β)1−δi. (11)
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A Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm alternately samples [β,θ|Y,D]a n d
[Y|β,θ,D]. The vector [β,θ|Y,D] is eﬃciently sampled with a random walk Metropolis
Hastings step Hanson and Johnson (2002); Krishnan et al. (1999). A proposal density
to implement the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm that has worked very well in practice is
obtained from using the large sample estimated covariance matrix from ﬁtting the para-
metric log-logistic model via maximum likelihood. A simple Metropolis-Hastings step for
updating the components (Y 0,Y  1) one at a time ﬁrst samples a candidate (Y ∗
 0,Y∗
 1)f r o m
a Dirichlet(mY 0,mY  1) distribution, where m>0, typically m = 20. This candidate is
accepted as the “new” (Y 0,Y  1) with probability
ρ =m i n
	
1,
Γ(mY 0)Γ(mY 1)(Y 0)mY ∗
 0−wj2
(Y 1)mY ∗
 1−wj2
L(Y∗,θ,β)
Γ(mY ∗
 0)Γ(mY ∗
 1)(Y ∗
 0)mY 0−wj2(Y ∗
 1)mY 1−wj2L(Y,θ,β)

,
where j is the number of digits in the binary number  0a n dY∗ is the set Y with (Y ∗
 0,Y∗
 1)
replacing (Y 0,Y  1). The resulting Markov chain has mixed reasonably well for many data
sets unless w is set to be very close to zero.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
We will divide the ﬁnite time interval (0,L)i n t ot w os e t s . S e tD = {∀t ∈ (0,L):t =
L/n,n =1 ,2,...},a n ds e tC = {∀t ∈ (0,L):t ∈ ( L
n+1, L
n),n=1 ,2,...}. Then the union of
sets D and C w i l lb et h eo r i g i n a li n t e r v a l0 ,L.
The objective function is
z(t)=Cpm L/t  +[ pCd +( 1− p)Ccm]

 L/t E [N(t)] + E

N(L − t 
L
t
 )

It consists of the sum of two functions - the ﬁrst function is a constant times the ceiling
function f1(t)= L/t  which is lower semicontinuous with discontinuities at t = L/n,n =
1,2,.... The second function is
f2(t)=[ pCd +( 1− p)Ccm]

 L/t E [N(t)] + E

N(L − t 
L
t
 )

=[ pCd +( 1− p)Ccm]
	
 L/t 
 t
0
q(u)du +
 L−t L/t 
0
q(u)du

To show that f2(t) is continuous at t we will take the left and the right limit of f2(t)
when t goes to any point d = L/n in the set D and to any point c in the set C.
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lim
t→d+ f2(t)=n
 L/n
0
q(u)du +
 L−nL/n
0
q(u)du = n
 L/n
0
q(u)du
lim
t→d− f2(t)=( n − 1)
 L/n
0
q(u)du +
 L−(n−1)L/n
0
q(u)du = n
 L/n
0
q(u)du
The proof for the limit in set C follows from the fact that the ﬂoor function is constant
over any interval ( L
n+1, L
n),n=1 ,2,....
The validity of these limits will hold if the hazard function q(u) is continuous. In this
research the hazard function is the predictive hazard that comes from the MPT model.
Using the results from Hanson (2004), that function is twice diﬀerentiable. This completes
the proof.
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FIGURE 1
Polya tree prior distribution -
graphical representation of the binary partition
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FIGURE 2
MPT AFT hazard estimates
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FIGURE 3
MPT AFT survival estimates. 
From top to bottom are groups 2, 5, 3, 4, and 1.Submitted to European Journal of Operational Research
FIGURE 4
Estimated total cost function for Group 5
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FIGURE 5
Predictive distributions functions for Group 5